Doubt, disagreement, distrust
Disorganised scepticism
Dissent can be disruptive in intent but to assume so demonstrates contempt for any public accountability. So reframing to how public objections may be driven and the kind of scepticism that is considered essential to public trust, neither credulous nor cynical, dissent may reflect doubt, disagreement or distrust. And other people may well be unconvinced, make different subjective assessments and be suspicious of motivations. Transparency helps with all three of these, in different ways.
Asking just questions
Uncertainty is characteristic of understanding our world, so doubt ought to be a feature of public engagement with ideas. Sharing information in a form which can be assessed by others and setting out the uncertainty or unknowns offers some shared perception of how certain to be. And doubt can be a lack of information, difficulty understanding its support, and a need for more context.
People can have exactly the same information and disagree, because judgement draws on values which weigh on moral issues particularly. Subjective choices reflect what is important to individuals who have different responsibilities as well. Where people disagree elections can resolve a majority view while respecting differences of opinion. And people can place themselves in the context of different opinions.
A message is interpreted along with the credentials of the messenger, and may be treated cynically or credulously for those. But financial and other connections may not determine conclusions, and should not, so competing interests are disclosed, mitigated and managed. Motivations may draw on personal expectations which can be evident in a track record and associated standards of professional conduct.
Scepticism
Public scepticism may be fairly partisan, segmented and sporadic but not responding undermines trust as well as leaving other narratives unchallenged. However, it is more important to respond to the concern by talking about the specific uncertainty, values and credentials as appropriate. Listening carefully and getting to the particular point builds shared appreciation of the issue, and that narrative is important.
Merton tried to systematise scientific values as stepping around these concerns. Commun(al)ism tried to share problems and the need for solutions; disinterestedness meant competing interests would play no role; and universalism meant we were sharing the same fundamental ideas. But this was the basis of an organised scepticism where new information would be scrutinised and tested systematically.
None of Merton’s ideals work very well as material is not shared freely, science is expensive and politics drives some of the demand for research. More than that, the scepticism is disorganised, so that it is easily disrupted by those seeking to profit or to drive an ideological conclusion. Indeed outright fraud is not readily addressed by any part of the system, and scientific bodies are cowed by large financial interests.
Opening up
For scepticism to be organised, sharing what is known and the uncertainties effectively, where choices have political values in their determination and talking about motivations ought to be obvious for the public good. Yet concealing each is a source of advantage to individuals making discoveries or hiding poor practice, and getting their own way in policy and funding by unscientific means and trust erodes. Natural leadership would fall to scientific bodies, promoting the community interest.